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I have made the serious decision to be, next
year, a candidate for the presidency of the
Republic ....1 wanted to make the official
announcement here, in this little Breton house ..
where I was born 58 years ago, ...in this land of
[Brittany], where civilization has asserted
itself for more than 5000 years ..on the shores
of this ocean, ..a symbol, for all men, of
liberty, [and] discovery ...and [a symbol] for
France, of her glorious adventures as conquerors
and civilizers. (... ) It is because I have the
prof'ound,conviction that the homeland is in
grave dangsl-. and that the French are threatened
with being ruined, submerged, and subjugated,
that I decided to engage myself in this
decisive battle for the future of France.
--Jean-Marie Le Pen, April 26, 1887.
political brochure: Lettre Parisienne
[author's translation]
These words epitomize the political rhetoric of Jean-Marie
\
f Le Pen. He is the undisputed and charismatic leader of the
National Front, a French party of the extreme right. The
National Front is an ultra-conservative, xenophobic party which
has experienced an astounding electoral success in recent years.
The party was established in 1872, and achieved its first
political success in 1883. In the presidential elections of
1888, Le Pen surprised the French political community by drawing
nearly fifteen percent of the popular vote. This is both a
remarkable and an alarming success for an extremist party. How
is it possible that a man who espouses such fanatical moral and
ethical values, could gain so much political support?
The National Front is extremely nationalistic, and Le Pen's
main themes center around immigration. In fact, he blames both
) unemployment and crime on the very large immigrant--mostly North
cultural identity. or the French people. His political
-.1
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AFrican--population. Le Pen advocates. in many cases. their
deportation in order to preserve the economic well-being. and
victories. however. have made many citizens and politicians very
uneasy. Does the success of the National Front indicate a
national or perhaps global trend towards the conservative
right?
AlreadY the National Front has had a proFound impact on
contemporarY national French politics. Le Pen is considered the
wild card in the game since he has drawn support From both ends
of the political spectrum. The other parties must verbally
deFine themselves relative to Le Pen. and make clear where they
stand on "his" issues. For example. his emphasis on immigration
has provoked the other established parties into Formulating
their own immigration policies.
This examination of the National Front will be approached
From several diFFerent perspectives. The first subject to be
addressed is Jean-Marie Le Pen himself. I shall briefly discuss
his background. as well as the various conditions which
contributed to his socialization. AFter tracing his development
from childhood to the founding of his party. I will analyze the
ideology on which the National Front is based. Thereafter. the
specifics of the National Front's political platform will be
explored.
The second section provides an analysis of the electorate
supporting Le Pen. First. a picture is drawn of the typical
National Front voter. in terms of his social. economic and
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political background. Then, a geographic investigation will be
pursued, determining in which areas or the country the National
Front's support is concentrated.
evolution or this support.
The third section or this thesis is devoted to determining
Finally, I will study the
the extent or inrluence the National Front has exercised in
contemporary politics. I accomplish this with an extended
analysis or each party's reaction to the Le Pen phenomenon. The
established parties or the right, the lert, and the extreme
lert, will each be treated in turn. The investigation will rocus
not only on the verbal reactions to the National Front, but also
on the more rundamental policy changes instituted due to the
popularity or certain Lepenien themes.
The rinal section compares the National Front to other
extreme rightist movements or France's past. One or these was a
stable long-lasting party, which gradually lost inrluence; the
other three were very popular but short-lived creations. I will
examine both the ideology and political strategy or each or
these parties. Next, I will suggest a rew reasons ror their
eventual railure. By understanding the reasons why similarly
constructed parties railed, one can make a projection as to the
National Front's potential ror survival.
This study or the National Front and its leader, Jean-Marie
Le Pen, is intended to be inrormative and objective. However,
this project has been undertaken with the rirm belier that Le
Pen's success is a disturbing, ir not an alarming, phenomenon.
The National Front has already proved itselr to be a real
him is at this point unknown; but his potential is great.
for this reason that the study of Le Pen and his
ultra-conservative party is so very important.
It is
i 1
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political contender in modern France. In addition. the party
continues the country's historical legacy of traditionally
rightist movements. Moreover. the success of a party like the
National Front can very often extend beyond a country's
geographic borders. Many parties in the past have not only let
their zealous voices be heard. but have actually altered the
global political climate. All these movements were. at one
time. small and inconsequential. However. somewhere along the
line. they blossomed into terribly powerful forces. Jean-Marie
Le Pen has already made a political difference; he has already
carved his place in history. What the future holds in store for
-5-
Jean-Marie Le Pen was born on June 20, 1928, at La
Trinit~-sur-Mer in French Brittany. Jean-Marie was, from the
start, very much influenced by his environment. His mother. the
daughter of small farmers. and his fisherman father raised him
modestly in a city where conservative Catholicism and patriotism
reigned. The rugged land of Brittany, dotted with prehistoric
megaliths, and imbued with the legends of her ancient Celtic
ancestors, was an environment steeped in traditions of heroism.
Jean-Marie's adored grandfather. Pierre Marie Hubert Le Pen. was
also a fisherman who taught his grandson about ships. and the
ocean--and about his ancestors. He told the boy stories of
glorious wars long past. of the victorious French. of freedom
and of life. This man passed on to another generation the
age-old oral tradition begun by the Celts themselves. and thus
instilled in him both a lust for adventure. and a keen verbal
ability. Jean-Marie's first dream was to become a marine.
Being a fisherman could not have satisfied his desire to serve
his mother-country. This aspiration is exemplified by his
statement that "the image which best symbolizes France is that
of a flag on the stern or a warship." 1
It was during adolescence that some or Le Pen's political
views were rirst formed. In 1944. at the age of sixteen. he
became decisively anti-Gaullist and anti-Communist. This was
the time or a national rivalry between the two French generals
Petain and de Gaulle. The impressionable Jean-Marie was
convinced by his teachers and general environment that Petain
was the man who had acted for the good or the country. while de
Gaulle had not done enough to ensure peace. His anti-Communist
-6-
views developed primarily during, and especially following,
Liberation. In addition, he notes that in Trinit6-sur-Mer the
Communists were all of the lower and less desirable classes of
society: "lazy workers and the professionally unemployed." 2
In 1947 Le Pen left Brittany for Paris and enrolled in law
school. Always active and outspoken, he belonged to several
student organizations and had a hand in certain publications.
His first notable position was that of President of the rightist
student group Corpo (which aided conservative political parties,
hung posters, organized students, etc.). When he was 25 years
old, Le Pen volunteered for the First Foreign Battalion of
Paratroopers to fight the Communist Viet-mihn in Indochina. To
his disappointment the battle was over by the time he arrived.
The French withdrawal from Vietnam, although not a national
humiliation, certainly did not fit with his idea of the always
glorious and victorious French. Le Pen remarks that it was this
very evening, May 8, 1954, that he realized: "it takes more
than soldiers and courage to win wars ...I swore to myself that
if I should return I would consecrate my life to politics." 3
Following a short stay in Indochina, where he claims to
have fully recognized the horrible tactics of the Communists, Le
Pen returned to Paris. Pierre PouJade, the leader of a
conservative political party, the "Union de Defense des
Commer~ants et Artisans de France" (U.D.C.A.), was looking for
someone who could broaden his base of support. Specifically, he
wanted someone who would appeal to veterans and who could run
points to their disagreement over the Algerian issue. Le Pen
-7-
ror deputy in the National Assembly. The acquisition or Le Pen
was really a coup ror Poujade. due to the rormer's innate public
speaking ability. He became the principal orator For the
U.D.C.A .• and was elected to the Parliament (Chamber or
Deputies) on January 2. 1856. He represented the rirst sector
or the Seine in Paris. and at age 28 was the youngest deputy
ever elected. However. Le Pen began rairly quickly to rorge his
) own path within the~ party. He distanced himselr. remained
independent. and was outspoken on many issues--especially on the
Algerian problem. which would come to play an important role in
his career. ....
It was not long arter his election that Le Pen broke with
Poujade and his party. Recounting the reasons today. Le Pen
claims that Poujade was in a very good position to make some
positive steps toward rinding a solution (Poujade's wire was
Algerian. and many Algerians were sympathetic to his cause
because they were artisans and merchants). Unrortunately. says
Le Pen. he drew back From his responsibilities. Pierre Poujade.
on the other hand. irritably remarks that Le Pen never really
was a Poujadist. and simply used his party to get into a
powerrul position. He resents any claims that today Le Pen is a
neo-poujadist. and says that Le Pen wanted only to turn the
U.D.C.A. into a mass movement or the extreme right.
Whatever the case. six months arter his election Le Pen
asked to be readmitted into his rormer paratrooper battalion. He
was rirst sent to the Suez. and then rinally to Algeria. Five
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years Following his stay there, in 1962, several reports
surFaced accusing Le Pen of having tortured a young Algerian
man, one who purportedly supported the French cause. There
never was a Judicial procedure, and no one can really be sure of
what happened. What is sure, however, is that Le Pen's career
was continuallY hampered by these allegations. 6
The French loss of Algeria struck Le Pen in a personal way.
Not only was the French empire crumbling away, so were the
dreams and illusions of his boyhood. During the decade
Following this event, Le Pen remained politically active, but he
did not really Find his calling until he and some Friends
Founded the movement For which he is best known. Anticipating
the legislative elections of 1973, he established The National
Front on October 5, 1972. Le Pen was immediatley installed as
the organization's president, probably due to the unwavering
strength of his convictions, and to his eFFectiveness as a
speaker.
The National Front's success was minimal during the 1970's
For several reasons. The main one was that the issues on Le
Pen's agenda were not so crucial during this decade. For
example, unemployment was not outrageous, the immigrant
situation seemed under control, and perhaps most importantly,
the country's president belonged to a conservative party. Le
Pen's party was new, and considered by many to be Fanatical and
inconsequential. In 1981, however, a socialist president was
elected, and Just 2 years later the National Front began making
signiFicant gains. Not only was there now a leFtist in power,
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but the issues which concerned Le Pen (especially unemployment
and immigration) suddenly interested the entire nation. 6
Le Pen's first success showed up locally arter the
municipal and National Assembly elections in 1883. For example.
his party received 11.3% in the twentieth 'arrondissement' or
Paris; 12% in the department or Morbihan; and a startling 16.7%
in a town called Dreux. where a coalition was rormed to prevent
the return or a lertist mayor. [It is important to keep in mind
that France operates on a multi-party system in which even the
most popular parties orten receive no more than 20% or the rirst
round votes]. Even more astonishing were the results or the
European Parliament elections or 1884, in which the National
Front got 11.06% of the national vote-- above and beyond the
most optimistic predictions. As a resul t, ten ext reme
right-wing delegates were among the 81 sent to represent France
at the European Parliament in Strasbourg. The parliamentary
elections or 1886 resulted in a ten percent share ror Le Pen's
party. a number which could make up the crucial dirrerence
needed ror the right to establish a majority. Finally. when Le
Pen ran for ofrice during the presidential elections or 1888. he
finished the first round with a whopping 14.4% or the national
vote. This was only about six percentage points behind
runner-up Jacques Chi rae, and under twenty points behind the
eventually victorious Francois Mitterand. This is recognized as
an incredible success for a marginal party, and it leads one to
believe that the National Front could become one of France's
"established" parties. Clearly the National Front, headed by Le
-------------
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Pen. is a rorce to be reckoned with in contemporary French
politics. 7
The success or the National Front is. or course. not only
due to Le Pen's charisma. but also to the policies which he
espouses. The central theme or his campaign is immigration.
France has a very large number or immigrants (mostly North
AFrican Arabs) who. he believes. are the cause or many problems.
What are some of these problems? The two most obvious ones are
unemployment and insecurity. His campaign speeches preach that
ir there are 200.000 unemployed French. then 200.000 immigrants
should be deported. The immigrant population is also. according
to Le Pen. the cause or most crime. In his eyes it is possible
to kill two birds with one stone: decrease the immigrant
population and the crime and unemployment rates will both
decrease proportionally. Furthermore. crime and unemployment
are not the only two disadvantages or housing the immigrants.
Le Pen believes that France's population is disintegrating from
a pure French race to a mixed one. Not only are there incidents
or cross-breeding. but he estimates that since the birth rate is
higher among the Arabs than it is among the French. eventually
the immigrants will outnumber the natives. Inrluenced. perhaps.
by the strong regional and national pride or Brittany. he
exPresses fear that his country may lose her cultural identity.
and proclaims: "France ror the French!" He uses similarly
errective imagery to emphasize this point to his audiences. Le
Pen's solution consists or rigid immigration control. and the
deportation or a large number or roreigners already in France.
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In addition. he advocates strict and harsh reforms of
legislation regarding both naturalization and automatic
citizenship. B
The remainder of Jean-Marie Le Pen's program is based on
four general factors: (a) a strong state system strictly
regulating domestic security; (b) less state bureaucracy and
control; (c) rebirth of a moral order; and (d) international
security and anti-Communism. The First point has to do with
crime and enforcement. Le Pen is in favor of a strong and
effective state-controlled police force and Justice system. He
is for the reinstatement of the death penalty for certain
crimes, such as drug trafficking, and terrorism.
advocates the exPulsion of foreign delinquents.
Alongside this strengthening of certain governmental areas,
He also
t
is the second factor of reducing state bureaucracy and ,control.
This is, most likely, a reaction to the socialist government
which has nationalized many industries and institutions. Le Pen
proposes fewer taxes, a general simplificaton of government, and
the abolition of state monopolies in favor of the more
traditional small-scale enterprise. He favors a complete
separation of state and education (allowing for more defined
religious instruction).
The third pillar of Le Pen's campaign platform has to do
with morality and social issues. He is openly against
homosexuality and abortion.
aspects of this policy area.
There are, however, more subtle
For instance, as mentioned above,
Le Pen talks quite a bit about the future of the French people.
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'.!': He claims that the family has declined in importance, and that
l
there are not enough French children to replace the present
populat ion. He is, thus, in favor of legislation which would
support the family unit. To encourage women to have children,
he proposes a "maternal revenue" for mothers who do not want to
work in order to raise and educate their children. This serves
to strengthen the traditional type of family, and a position
which emphasizes where women "belong" in French society.
The final point of Le Pen's platform is that of
international security and anti-Communism. In his mind the
French Communists are inextricably linked to Moscow, and ever on
the verge of a political plot. Some analysts remark that this
theme is superficially developed and not of much consequence. He
does, however, seem to base his few foreign policy ideas on this
fear of the Communist threat. He is very much for the
development of a European defense. He would like to replace the
defense provided by the United States with one which would
secure Europe even more from the dangerous threat from the
East. 9
Jean-Marie Le Pen bases his campaign, then, on the central
theme of immigration, which he links to unemployment and
insecuri ty. This is bolstered by the four main points he
proposes in order to effect. in his mind, positive social and
political change. There is. however, one more, perhaps less
obvious campaign tactic Le Pen employs in order to maximize his
support base. Very subtly, he portrays himself as a logical and
reasonable man who simply has remained faithful to his
-13-
principles. By avoiding the label of 'fanatic'. Le Pen comes
across as "just another" politician. And the National Front. by
participating whole-heartedly in the electoral process. is
presented as a party of the traditional right. Le Pen even
accuses the mainstream rightist party of France. the
Rassemblement Pour la R~publique (RPR). of having betrayed its
voters by acting in a centrist rashion.
Regardless-of his ideology and campaign tactics.
however. it is largely due to LePen's charisma that he has
achieved such success. Most obviously. Le Pen is a superb
orator. He understood quickly that in order to appeal to the
general public. one must speak to them in a language they can
understand. He has never spoken the jargon of a political,
scientist; instead he has spoken clearly and forcefully. He
does not insinuate or analyze, he simply says what he feels.
This is where another important trait comes in: feeling. Le
Pen is very capable of dramatizing a situation, of using intense
imagery, or forcefully simple allusions [as in the opening
quote: this ocean ...a symbol. for all men. of liberty [and]
discovery ...and for France, or her glorious adventures as
conquerers and civilizers]. But these are just stylistic
devices. What are the other tactics he uses to lure voters into
supporting his party? The single most important one is perhaps
the veil or patriotism in which he shrouds his entire campaign.
He is not being racist, he is simply patriotic--or so it might
seem. Next to nationalism, there are other traditional values
which permeate every aspect of his campaign. Family,
among others. will be addressed in the rollowing section. 10
,
I
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religion--or morality--and honest work are the most apparent.
Jean-Marie Le Pen has been very successrul in exploiting these
traditional values by using his verbal abilities to attract. and
eventuallY convince. a large sector or the population. But what
type or person supports Le Pen? Is his electorate made up or
people From all walks or lire. or do his supporters all stem
rrom one particular social and economic class? These questions.
***
to those voters who have responded to his message. First. the
-15-
Jean-Marie Le Pen is the driving rorce behind the National
Front which. as we have seen. has celebrated increasing
successes ror the past several years. Having already analyzed
Le Pen's ideological platform. we shall now turn our attention
typical Le Pen voter will be analyzed in terms of his or her
social and economic background. Secondly. the geographic
regions exhibiting the greatest concentration or National Front
support--mostly the large cities in the South-- will also be
examined in terms or their social and economic conditions. More
specirically. Marseille will serve as a case study since it is
situated in the South or France. and is the home of the largest
National Front electorate in the country. After having analyzed
the current support ror Le Pen. we will look back at its
evolution. It seems that between 1984 and 1986 a major shirt in
the National Front's electorate occurred. in which the party
lost many or its traditionally conservative voters. and replaced
them with the votes or lertist derectors. This national shirt
is represented in the voting histories or two Parisien
neighborhoods.
The general picture. or media portrayal. or the National
Front voter is that or a lower class. lower income. patriot.
employed as an industrial worker. The steriotypical Lepenien
voter is generally round in the large. industrial cities of the
South. where crime and unemployment run high. and most
importantly. where a very large number or immigrants have made
their new homes. The economic situation or these French natives
-16-
is so bad that they rind relier in Le Pen's nationalistic
rhetoric, which provides an immigrant scapegoat ror their
problems. Some statistics about this electorate are available.
Socially, the voters are not Just workers, but very strong
support is evident among artisans and small shopkeepers. There
is even a signiricant number or proressionals supporting Le Pen.
Over two-thirds or the voters are non-practicing Catholics and
60% are male. There is evidence that unstable voters will tend
to vote ror Le Pen rather than ror an established party.
That
is, marginal supporters or both the lert and the right, who do
not strongly identirY with either party, tend to vote ror the
National Front. The unemployed have alsO voted in rairly large
numbers ror Le Pen, (12% in 1984, 14% in 1986), and this rigure
has surelY risen in recent years.
On a national scale. support ror the National Front has
overwhelmingly come rrom the southern Mediterranean departments
Or France.
As noted abOve. the highest levels or support are
reported rrom those cities with large roreign populations. more
Within
speciricallY, the unintegrated North African immigrants.
the other departments, highest support is alsO concentrated in
the large cities, where a proportionallY large number or
immigrants are round. 11
The question to be addressed at this point is why the
greatest support ror the National Front is round in the
Mediterranean regions or the country. What is it about these
areas that makes Le Pen SO popular? The reasons are both social
and economic.
The decline or Southern industries coupled with
-17-
the increase in unemployment has had the most significant
inFluence. Between 1975 and 1986, the percent of the population
activelY employed by industrY Fell from 38 to less than 30 in
this region. Workers are being laid off with the increase in
automation; and some people claim that workers, as a class, are
disappearing entirely. 12 The naval industries in many of the
large port cities have been declining in recent years as well.
And the inclusion of Spain in the Common Market has hurt many
small agriculturists. 13 What really sets these cities apart,
however, is the very large number of immigrants who live there.
For instance, in Aix-en-Provence. a city of 120,000. there are
oFficiallY 9,900 foreigners, of which 5.300 are North African.
But this number is in reality even higher due to the large
number or illegal immigrants. When these estimates are
included, the number reaches a total of eleven to twelve
thousand foreigners. 1~
These are, then, some of the general characteristics of the
Southern cities. I will now, however, take the second largest
city of France, Marseille, as the prime example of current
National Front support. Marseille is located on the
Mediterranean, and is the capital of the Bouches-du-Rh~ne
department. It is also the country's busiest commercial
seaport. Its population is approximately 870.000. among which
100,000 are North African. The unemployment rate is rather
high: 14.2% in 1982. Almost fourteen percent of the city's
workers are employed in manufacturing, and 12.5% of the labor
force is in transportation. Finally, one in three laborors are
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somehow involved in port-related activities. With this kind or
rocus on the city's industries. it is no wonder that their
economic decline has hit the people hard. As the workers try to
cope with the economic situation. they must also handle the
crime. In 1881. there were 8.4 criminal orrenses per 100
people. 15
Marseille has traditionally been a bulwark or the Communist
party. which had originally dealt with social. economic. and
even immigrant issues during their campaigns. It was governed
by a Communist mayor ror many years. Today. however. it is the
city with the strongest National Front support in all or France.
The number two National Front man in Marseille today. Andr~
Isoardo. was an active member or the Communist party ror most or
,
I
his lire. The National Front has rour deputies. 12 regional
counselors, and 4000 party members in Marseille. Le Pen's
speeches sometimes attract as many as 20.000 spectators. And in
the presidential election or 1888. Marseille voted 28.34~ ror Le
Pen, and only 26.81% ror Mitterrand. 16
The combination in Marseille or high unemployment rates,
declining industries, high crime, and the large number or
unassimilated Arab immigrants has created a veritable breeding
ground ror Le Pen's xenophobic rhetoric. Marseille really
typiries the current support ror the National Front.
However. Le Pen's electorate was not always made up or the
type or individual described above. In ract, it appears that
between the European elections or 1884. and the legislative
elections or 1886. a major shirt took place in the make-up or Le
the political nature of its inhabitants. Generally speaking.
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Pen's national support base. That is. those people who voted
for Le Pen in 1986 are the foundation of the party's current
support group. already discussed above. The people who voted
for Le Pen prior to 1986--and especially in 1984 when the party
achieved its first major success--stem from an entirely
different social and economic class. In addition. their voting
histories are nearly completely opposed to those who support the
National Front today. This national shift of support is
exemplified in the voting histories of two rather distinct
Parisian neighborhoods. 17
For the European elections in 1984. the highest
percentage of Parisian National Front support came from the
Western sections of the city. This area is generally made up of
bourgeois neighborhoods. in which many families own two cars.
The inhabitants are often professionally. or semi-professionally
employed. This is also the area with the highest concentration
of Spanish and Portuguese immigrants (who comprise 25X of the
foreigners living in Paris). These foreigners are. at a fairly
high percentage. employed as household domestics. or hold other
service-oriented positions. For example. they work as nannies.
cleaning women. gardeners. or concierges. mostly for the
above-mentioned French bourgeois families. A total of 38% of the
Spanish and Portuguese immigrants are so employed. as opposed to
12% of Arab immigrants. and 5% of the French population residing
in Paris. Another characteristic of this residential area is
they are fairly active in politics. Judging by the number of
did not come from the West as it had two years before. Instead
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people who vote. In addition, this is an electorate firmly
anchored on the right. The success of the National Front in
these Western sections of Paris probably points to a xenophobic
reaction which the French voters had towards the immigrants they
employed or encountered. In addition, it is safe to assume a
political reaction to the Socialist government in power (protest
vote) . Exasperated with the left, they seem to have gone much
farther to the right then they normally would have. 16
Two years later, during the legislative elections of
1886, the National Front had a return of 10.88X in the city of
Paris. This time, however, the maJor area of Parisian support
the support came from the North-Eastern sections of the city.
This is a much poorer area comprised mostly of working-class
neighborhoods. In fact between 50 and 56X of its French
population are workers (ouvrisrs). These North-Eastern
neighborhoods also house the highest percentage of North African
immigrants (Algerians, Tunisians, and Moroccans), who comprise
28% of the total foreign population of Paris. As opposed to the
European immigrants holding service-oriented Jobs, 58% of the
Arabs are employed as industrial workers. The poor
neighborhoods in which they reside are generally over-populated,
and the living conditions are harsh. Politically speaking,
there is another difference between this area and the richer,
Western sections of the city. First of all, the French workers
are less politically active than their bourgeois neighbors, as
d th umber O
~ voter abstentions.etermined by e n ~
Most importantly
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however, the poor voters or the North-East traditionally stick
to the political lert. In the elections or 1881, ror example,
West Paris voted ror the right. while the North-East
working-class neighborhoods voted at a rate or 60X for the
Socialists. However. it is also this section where the number
or abstentions was the highest. 19
So we see, rrom one election to the next, a significant
shift in the support base of the National Front. The bourgeois
conservatives voted in large numbers for the National Front in
the European elections of 1884. However, by 1886 they seem to
have returned their votes to the conventional right, while the
poor working-classes, who usually vote for the left. gave their
protest votes to Le Pen. What are the reasons for this shift?
According to one analyst, the reasons are mostly economic and
politicaL The early 1880's experienced an economic crisis
(recession) including a significant increase in unemployment.
The North-Eastern sections of Paris became quite overcrowded and
uncomfortable. There was also a general disillusionment with
the Socialist government. Le Pen's nationalistic approach, and
especially his handY use of the Arab immigrants as a scapegoat
for the economic problems of the country, greatly appealed to
the lower working classes who cohabitated with these very
immigrants. Consequently, these electors switched their votes
from the left to the extreme right for the legislative elections
of 1886. The residents of the more bourgeois neighborhoods, on
the other hand. decided against the party for whom they had
voted two years earlier. One possible reason is simply their
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return to the traditional right. Since the European election
was perceived as largely inconsequential (because it would not
affect them directly), they could afford to express their
disapproval of the Socialist government by voting for the
extreme right. However, with the advent of an important
election, they may have chosen to cast a vote which would really
count, in terms of actuallY electing a significant number of
conservatives to Parliament. 20
So the electorate of the National Front has evolved over
the years. Today, the party finds its support base among the
poorer, lower classes who believe themselves to be directly
affected by the immigrants with whom they share their
neighborhoods. The worsening economic situation of the large
/ Mediterranean cities, plus the proportionately high number of
immigrants who live there, explains why these areas exhibit the
greatest amount of support for the National Front. It is in
cities like Marseille that the party has hopes of gaining local
power before moving into the national political arena.
Yet, there are many who claim that Le Pen's success has
already been significant enough to have granted him political
clout. He seems to have laid claim to certain aspects of the
national agenda, and has, perhaps, even affected the workings of
the established parties. In any case, it is clear that the
traditional parties of both the left and the right have their
work cut out for them.
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In an attempt to analyze the increasing popularity of the
National Front, thus far, we have approached the movement and
its leader from several different perspectives. First, we
looked at Le Pen himself and what he has contributed to the,
party. Second, we examined the National Front's electorate to
determine the origin and intensity of support. At this point we
must ask whether' or not Le Pen has any influence beyond his
circle of supporters. How does the National Front, and Le Pen
as its leader, fit into the national arena of French politics?
-or does it? What have been the reactions, if any, of the more
established parties? Do they feel threatened, challenged, or
completely unaffected? In other words. does Lepenism radiate
beyond the National Front and either directly or indirectly
)
influence the national political agenda? In order to determine
this we must examine the reactions of the established parties to
the Le Pen phenomenon. I shall begin with the moderate right.
(the RPR). move to the traditional left. and conclude with the
established party of the far left. the Communists.
I begin with the conventional right because certainly many.
if not most, of the National Front electorate originated here.
In the early 1880's there were a number of collaborations
between the established right and the National Front. The
Rassemblement Pour la Republique, the RPR. is the party of the
right, and the Union pour la Democratie Fran9aise. or UDF. is a
right-leaning centrist party. These two parties very often form
coalitions in order to gain a majority against the Socialist
party. However. in some cases their union has been insufficient
received 17% in the first round. Consequently, four National
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to achieve a majority; thus, there are several instances of an
RPR-UDF-NF coalition. This was the case in the previously cited
city of Dreux. during the municipal elections of 1983. The list
of National Front candidates, headed by Jean-Pierre Stirbois,
Front candidates were incorporated into the second round
coalition list of the opposition right. It was through this
combined effort that they defeated the Socialists. The alliance
with the National Front was applauded by the national leader of
the RPR, Jacques Chirac. In fact all of the major leaders of
the right approved except for Simone Veil. Her objection,
however, was dismissed by these leaders as a result of "personal
problems," apparently a reference to the fact that she is Jewish
and was deported during World War Two. 24
The Dreux election, as noted above, was among the National
Front's first major victories, and Le Pen's success attracted
much attention.
In January of 1984, only four months following
the second round in DreuX, Le Pen was asked to take part in a
series of political programs.
Excerpts of these journalistic
interviews were often shown the next day on the national news.
Le Pen was given the opportunity to explain and defend his
policies.
In addition, "each time an established leader of the
right appeared on an interview, he was forced to define himself
relative to Le Pen. "26 As the media attention increased. it
grew more difficult for the voting public to remain indifferent.
The number of both sympathizers and opponents increased.
although many of Le Pen's basic themes remained popular.
Iff eet t-,
generally opposed an alliance with the National Front. Although
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By the Spring or 1885. the leaders or the traditional right
the reasons ror this evolution are dirficult to pinpoint. there
seems to have been some inrluence by both the church and other
anti-racist movements. Additionally. the success of the extreme
right during the European elections probably convinced
established party leaders that the National Front was not simply
) - .experiencing a trans~tory victory. but actuallY presented them
with a formidable political challenge. The RPR later issued a
rormal announcement that there were to be no alliances
whatsoever between its party members and those of the National
Front--even on the local level. 26
Although the National Front had lost some support among
voters of the traditional right. many of Le Pen's themes
remained quite popular.
It is due to this very fact that the
gradual distancing of the rightist parties from the National
Front was accompanied by the incorporation of Lepenien themes
onto their national agendas. For example. both the RPR and the
UDF proposed measures aimed at encouraging immigrants to return
to their native countries. as well as at reducing social
benefits paid to permanent residents. In addition, the RPR
suggested reforms of the naturalization laws to make becoming a
citizen more difficult. 27
GraduallY, more and more anti-immigration rhetoric
has round its waY into the speeches of party leaders.
Politicians generally came to believe that Le Pen's success
implied two things:
first. the legitimacy and gravity or the
as a drain on their electorates. In order to win back some or
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immigration issue. and second. the problem or the National Front
their voters. party leaders agreed that they must attack the
problem at its source. For example. Jacques Chirac- "hit out at
the immigrant population or France as a source or unemployment
and urban tension. and as a drain on the national purse." And.
the ex-president or France. Giscard d'Estaing. responding to the
question or how the opposition--that is. the right--should deal
with the National Front, stated that "the problem of the extreme
right's success must be tackled at its root: immigration. " 2B
This evolution of the right from an attitude of support to
an absolute refusal to collaborate has continued to the present.
During the 1988 presidential elections the RPR leader Chirac
found himself in a very difricult situation. After the rirst
round of elections. the Socialist Mitterand stood with 34~ or
the vote; Chirac had less than 20%.
In order for the latter to
win the second round. he would have to get all the votes given
the centrist UDF candidate Raymond Barre--an extremely unlikely
prospect--plus the great majority of the National Front voters.
Obviously this presented a sticky situation since he would have
to please people on both ends of the rightist spectrum.
Should
he make a plea for the 14% who voted Le Pen and risk sending
many moderates into the Socialist camp? Or should he give in to
the liberal constituencY and ignore the extremists completely?
29 The political strategists in all camps were hard at work the
weeks between the first and second rounds.
Chirac's advisers
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finally agreed on absolutelY no discussions with Le Pen. One of
them told him: "Your future does not end on May 8th. You have
another ten years ahead of you. Don't compromise yourself by
playing. for example. a violin under Le Pen's balcony." 30
The situation was. of course. not Just in Chirac's hands.
for Le Pen had a choice to make as well. Knocked out of the
final race. he could still influence its outcome by asking his
loyal electorate to vote for either Mitterand or Chirac. He
could even ask them to abstain completely. However. certain men
at the top of the National Front hierarchy were at odds as to
whom they should endorse. Some preferred the right for its
political values while others believed the National Front would
fare better if the country were in the hands of a Socialist. 31
So we see the difficult situation Chirac was put in by the power
and presence of the National Front. And. interestingly.enough.
the Socialists have not been immune to its challenge either.
The victory at Dreux. a turning point for Le Pen. as well
as ror the platrorms Or the established right. also affected the
policies Or the lertist government. In 1884 the Socialist Prime
Minister. Laurent Fabius. said on national television that
although he disagreed with Le Pen's solutions. the questions he
posed were indeed valid. One month later new measures were
enacted to help control the influx of immigrants. For example.
"stiffer sanctions against illegal immigration were announced.
together with new measures to clamp down on wives and families
Joining inmigrant workers in France. Stricter border controls
were to be b r-o ught; into force. with a more rigorous system for
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tracking down 'rake tourists. "' 32 These measures are
especially signiricant in light or Mitterand's traditional
stance on immigrants: namely, that all immigrants residing on
French territory ror at least rive years will, or should, have
the right to vote in municipal elections. However, the rise or
the National Front has rorced Mitterand to de-emphasize this
proposition considerably. In 1885 Mitterand conceded the
unpopularity or the proposal and claimed it was not worth
alienating the people rrom the government. 33
Mitterand seems to have given in to the other Lepenien
theme or 'law and order' as well. Although the Socialists have
dealt with the problem or "insecurity" cautiously in the past,
they have recognized the necessity or addressing the public's
concern about crime. Over the past three years the French
gOvernment promised 400 million [English pounds] to a new
training program and new technology ror the police rorce--which
came at a time or public spending cutbacks. Here again we see
the inrluence or the National Front reaching rar beyond its own
Political boundaries. 34
These governmental actions may have been enrorced somewhat
relunctantly. However, there are many who claim the Socialists
have only themselves to blame. In 1885, Mitterand instituted a
Change in the system or representation. He changed it rrom a
....
maJority system--in which only the party receiving a maJority or
the votes sends representatives to parliament--to a system or
proportional representation, in which each party is represented
according to its proportion or the total vote. The
: ;'UI lie' ;
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majority System favors the large parties because it denies the
others entrance into legislative government. The proportional
system. on the other hand. benefits the smaller parties by
alloting them at least a few seats. By instituting this change.
Mitterand hoped to divide the right. so the Socialists--who had
lost their majority--could maintain power. In his desire to
break the opposition. however. it seems he was responsible for
Le Pen's first real victories. and consequently. legitimation by
proof of support. Mitterand has been sharply criticized for this
action. and he must certainly wonder if he has created a
monster. 35
The success of the National Front following the institution
of proportional representation had two important results.
First. it gave Le Pen's party some legitimacy. Second. and
perhaps more crucial. is the fact that. in some cases. the
National Front actuallY holds the balance of power with which to
break a tie in the National Assembly. In addition. the
opposition has been forced to work with the National Front in
certain committees in order to achieve a bare majority. An
example is the Defense and Foreign Affairs Committee in which
the National Front holds the balance of power. This bargaining
position even extends to the regional level where the parties of
the right depend on National Front support in several
districts. 36
The National Front made the 1988 elections more difficult
for Mitterand as well.
As we have seen. he had to modifY his
positions on immigration and law and order. not onlY to please
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his electorate, but also in an attempt to regain those or his
supporters who had deFected to the National Front. These are
the voters, mostly ractory workers, who began with the Communist
Party, then switched to the Socialists, and rinished eventually
with Le Pen. 37
Having won the election, Mitterand now has a chance to
repair the damage he caused during his rirst term. He will
change the system rrom proportional back to majority
representation. With this it is probable that the National
Front will lose most of its seats. However, it is clear that
with the support the National Front has already received, it
will not disappear too quickly. 38
Let us finally turn to consider the relation or the
National Front to the Communist party. Although this is a party
or the extreme left, in the case or France it has long been
considered one or the four established parties. Over the past
decade, however, the Communist party has exPerienced a sharp
drop in electoral support. There are varied reasons ror this,
but perhaps the main one is simply the political climate or the
country. When the Communists were popular, a conservative party
was in power. The Communists began their gradual decline in
1881, despite the coalition formed with the eventually
victorious Socialists in the late seventies. The situation was
rurther exacerbated by the public's disenchantment with the
leftist government a rew years later. This, in addition to
internal strife and subsequent division, contributed
significantly to their downrall. It is at this point that we
National Front. In 1979 the Communists won 20% or the vote, in
-31-
witness the rise or the National Front. In ract it is striking
how closelY the raIl or the Communists parallels the rise or the
1981 only 15%, 11% in 1984, and in 1988 the Communist candidates
received only 5% or the vote. 39
Another interesting ractor about the Communist party is
that it was really one or the rirst parties to activelY discuss
)the problems or immi:'grationand security. Recognizing,
perhaps, that a large proportion or their electorate was--or
claimed to be--negatively arrected by liberal immigration
policies, the Communists addressed these issues nationally
during the 1981 presidential election campaign. At this time,
the other established parties had discussed immigration problems
only on a local level. However, the Communist party retreated
rrom its strident campaign arter realizing that it was not in
accord with its basic ideology. Although the major party
leaders generally opposed the initiatives or the Communists,
many local leaders supported them. Nevertheless, all parties
agreed that the problems or immigration, race and law and order
existed, and that a solution had to be round. 40
Le Pen certainly believes he has the answers, and so do a
sizable number or French citizens. As we have seen, however,
the inrluence or Le Pen and the party he created radiates rar
beyond the borders or his electorate. The reason he gained so
much support in the rirst place can certainly be attributed to
the gradual process or legitimation. Political scientist
Martain Schain claims that this process was three~rold. First,
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the party received a small amount or electoral support.
Secondly. the National Front was accepted as a "carrier or key
issues. " Finally came the acceptance by the political leaders
or the National Front "as a legitimate partner ror'inrluence.
mobilisation and/or decision-making." 41 By the time or the
Dreux victory. this three-rold process had been completed.
Therearter a seemingly more important aspect or legitimation
occurred: namely. the incorporation or Le Pen's themes into the
platrorms or the major parties. This conscious decision by
political leaders was essentially aimed at retrieving some or Le
Pen's supporters. However. it is likely that the established
parties' acceptance or the National Front and its premises
Further legitimized its position in the French political system.
Moreover. Le Pen can be seen as indirectly determining the
issues or debate and controlling political dialogue.
especially apparent during the election or 1988. 42
The implementation or proportional representation. and the
This was
coalitions rormed with the traditional right. gave the National
Front a more activelY inrluential position. The right. rorced
to work with the National Front. had to orrer them rairly
powerrul positions. Since the Socialists lack a strong
majority. both the right and the lert hang on the decisions or
the extreme right. since the National Front orten holds the
balance or power. Even the results or the 1988 presidential
elections hung somewhat on Le Pen's decision as to whom he would
throw his votes.
Obviously. then. the National Front has legitimized its
position as a real party or opposition. It has extended its
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inrluence into all the established parties or the country, and
has acted as catalyst, "setting in train a radicalization or
policy across the political spectrum." 43 Its members hold key
positions in parliament, keeping the right on a leash, and
determining the outcome or potentially crucial issues. But how
long will this last? Is this the beginning or a great party, or
merely the high point or an historically inconsequential one?
This is dirricult to predict. Yet, a clue may lie in the rate
or the extreme right parties or France's past.
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The National Front's success is based on its conservative
platform and extensive support base. Moreovel-, the party's
electoral victories have allowed it to extend its influence into
the national arena of contemporary French politics. Yet the
question arises as to how long the National Front will be able
to maintain its popularity. Le Pen and his party are considered
partakers in the classical right-wing traditi.on of twentieth-
century France. Therefore, one indication of the future of the
National Front is to analyze the success and/or failure of
similarly constructed parties. France has a long history of
extreme rightist movements, some more and some less radical.
These include the Action Fran9aise, a less radical and very
long-lasting party. especially popular during the 1830s; two
other parties of the 1930's: the Parti Social Fran~ais. and
the Parti populaire Fran~ais, which exhibited both enormous
popularity and high rates of participation, but which were
rather short-lived; and finally. the PouJadist movement of the
1850's, of which Le Pen himself was a member.
The Action Fran?aise was founded on June 20. 1899. It grew
out of the celebrated Dreyfus Affair. in which an innocent
(Jewish) man was accused and convicted of treason in order to
Cover up the corrupt actions of several top men in both the
government and the army. As the scandal was revealed. the
founder of the Action Franqaise. Charles Maurras. wrote an
article in defense of the army.
That is. although he certainly
suspected that some of the military men were guilty, he felt
that the army was a vital institution whose integrity must, at
simple, and it had a direct emotional appeal: patriotism,
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all costs, be kept intact. He believed it was in the interest
or the nation to keep the army out or the courtroom and orr the
scandal sheets.+4
Nationalism, then, was at the very core Or the movement.
This nationalism led them, by rerlection, to believe that
monarchism was the best political solution. This concept sounds
outdated to our modern ears, but at the time it seemed rairly
natural. One must understand that the Third Republic was
created in 1870, and thererore had only been in working
operation ror about a decade. The political situation was rather
rragile, and the member's or the Action Frangaise wanted
security. For them, a strong nationalistic government was the
answer, and this meant monarchism. However, although they had
"come rrom nationalism to monarchism by way Or logical
rerlection and practical empiricism, the men Or Action Fran?aise
were always to remain basically more nationalist than
monarchist .." 46 The ideology or the Action Fran?aise was
absolute sovereignty ror France, antiparliamentarism,
authoritarianism, and Catholicism. They yeal'ned f or- action, and
reared the people whom they believed threatened the ethnicity
and independence or the French people; ror example, the external
threat or Great Britain, and the internal threats posed by the
Jews and Freemasons. 46
The period between the wars was a time or extreme political
activity. Unstable politics, heightened by the economic
hardship or the Depression, led to the rormation or many small
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movement's" rabid nationalism, its rerurbished traditionall' e m,
extremist parties (or leagues) on both the lert and the right.
Moving with the times, the Action Franyaise became more active
as well, even though they were never rormed into an actual
political party. Historian Gordon Wright claims that the
and its arrogant elitism appealed to young activists in much the
same \Olaythat Leninism attracted another segment or youth. "48
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Action Franyaise was
only moderately radical, and perhaps this is the reason it
to voice the concerns or the conservative right. But when the
endured nearly rorty years. For when the national political
climate was subdued, the Action Fran?aise was the sole movement
situation became critical, many other, more radical, movements
appeared which orten overshadowed the Action Franyaise. Or
course, Murras' party did benerit at these times or crisis
because it could ally itselr to another movement, and thereby
pick up momentum. For example, in 1924, a lertist coaltion,
called the Cartel des Gauches, was electorally successrul and
took control or the parliament. As a result, all the rightist
parties banded together and increased their activism. They were
rewarded with a growing popular shirt towards the right. 4S
Although/it was originally the Catholic constituency which
made the Action Franyaise a success, it was also the cause or
its downrall. According to Wright, many Catholics had become
increasinglY suspicioUS or Maurras, and came to resent the
movement's tendency towards violent criticism. Arter having
studied the movement extensively, the Vatican condemmed it in
group, which lost a major portion or its supporters. And,
Fran9aise and the paper it published. This devastated the
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1826, and asked all French Catholics to ignore the Action
concept much too outdated ror our times. Nevertheless, there
When the crisis decade or the 1830's arrived
the Action Fran9aise round itselr quickly ,
outdistanced by newer authoritarian groups.
Yet the insidious doctrines or the movement had
made their way into the minds or an important
minority or the French elite and had sortened up
that elemQnt ror rascist or proto-rascist agitators.so
In comparing this movement to the National Front, then, we
see some similarities. Like the National Front today, the
Action Franyaise was very nationalistic, and claimed external
and internal dangers were threatening the French identity. It
also stressed the need ror an authoritarian government, although
certainly the National Front does not support a monarchy--a
are some major dirrerences. The National Front is a legitimate
political party, and wants to participate in the electoral
system. ConsequentlY, although Le Pen does verbally accuse his
opponents or many things, he remains within the limits or
acceptable political discourse. Violence and especially
terrorism are not condoned by Le Pen or his party. The Action
Franc;aise, on the other hand, never participated in elections,
although they orten claimed many members elected under other
rightist labels.
The question we are asking here, or course, is can we reach
any conclusions as to the ruture or the National Front by
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examining the rate or the Action Fran?aise? The Action
Franyaise is an example or a rairly stable movement or the
traditional French right. It endured almost rorty years as the
voice of the conservatives. at times when the political
atmosphere was relativelY calm. But the movement never evolved
into an independent political entity. and although essentially
nationalistic. it leaned on both Catholicism and monarchism as
the roundation or its support. When the Church abandoned the
movement. it basically rell apart because it never had developed
a loyal electorate.
Next. I shall look at two movements which appeared rather
spontaneously during the 1930's and which received extensive
political support. The rirst is the Croix du Feu. which
developed into the Pal~ti Social Franyais; and the second is the
Parti populaire Franyais.
The Croix du Feu was rounded in 1928 and began as a group
ror honored veterans. Although it began small. with
approximately 500 members. it grew rapidly under strong
leadership and substantial rinancial patronage. By the end or
1932 the groUP claimed thirty-six thousand members. and in 1933
it became clear that the leaders or the Croix du Feu had
political ambitions.
The movement's "appeal depended in part on
its amorphous vagueness; any patriot who wanted strong
d. l·k d communism could reel at home here.government and ~s ~ e
By 1935. the Croix du Feu was the largest or the leagues in
"51
France. and maintained considerable inrluence over its members.
A turning point in its development came in 1936 when the Lertist
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government declared all leagues illegal. The Croix du Feu
transformed itself immediately into a political party and
changed its name to the Parti Social Fran~ais (French Social
Party), or, PSF. Apparently, they had been convinced that
participation in the political system was valuable, and could
increase their influence ·significantly. They experienced their
greatest success following this conversion. Unfortunately for
them, it took place too late to realistically take part in the
1836 elections, and consequently only a few men made it into
parliament under the wings of other rightist parties.
Nevertheless. the PSF did claim a huge proportion of the
population: around three million by 1838. The party was well
and strictly organized. with many local organizations. as well
as groups for the children of party members. Their rise to
power and influence. however. was cut short with the advent of
World War Two. The preoccupation of this world disaster led to
the dissolution of the PSF (among others). And finally. any
hopes for a regrouping after the war. were dashed with the death
of the party's strong and charismatic leader. Colonel de La
Rocque. 52
The similarities between the National Front and the French
Social Party are striking. Like the National Front. the PSF was
guided by a conservative ideology which insisted on a strong.
anti-communist government. Moreover. the leaders of the PSF
decided to fully participate in the electoral system. and hence
had the opportunity to gain considerable political clout.
Although the Action Fran~aise lasted a long time. its own
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doctrine, outdated beliers, and lack or political constituency,
were the cause or its downrall. In the case or the PSF,
however, it seems their downrall was caused by external
circumstances. Who knows where they might have gone had the war
not interrupted their rise to power? Even the party's chance or
a reunion was roiled by the death or its powerrul leader. So,
the social and political state or the country, as well as the
continual support or a powerrul and charismatic leader, could be
two ractors which determine the success and duration or a
political party.
I will now brierly examine one other movement which
appeared during the same time period. The Parti Populaire
Fran9ais (French Populist or popular Party) appeared in 1836
under the leadership or Jacques Doriot. The most interesting
thing about the PPF is the political orientation rrom which it
drew most or its support. Doriot himselr had been an active
member or the Communist party, and even held some rairly
high-ranking positions. But in 1833 he did an about-race and,
like Mussolini, who later supported his party, became a rascist.
Anti-communism was really the only platrorm the PPF maintained,
but it became quite popular nevertheless, eventuallY attaining
nearly one-haIr million members. These members came mostly rrom
two very distinct political camps: communist derectors, and
more traditionally-minded conservatives, most likely misled by
patriotic rhetoric. This was not a party which wanted to
maintain the status quo, or reestablish the power or the elite.
Their goal was revolution. They wanted to abolish the old
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traditions and create a ~ elite. 63
The greatest similarity between Doriot's party and the
National Front, is the composition of their support bases.
noted in a previous section, much of Le Pen's support comes from
both the traditionalist camp as well as the communist one.
Nevertheless, Le Pen's electorate is much less radical than the
Doriot's electorate was. Obviously, the National Front is not
at all in favor of a revolution. On this issue, Le Pen's party
is much closer to the ideals of both the Action Fran~aise and
the French Social Party, both of which were less radical, and
wanted a conservative pluralistic system in which traditional
institutions were respected. There is another big difference
between the National Front and the PPF. The latter never
developed a political platform which went any farther than
declaring war on Communism. Consequently, the party could not
attract anyone whose interests and concerns extended beyond
this basic concept. It seems as if Doriot's party simply
dissolved, perhaps due to a lack or support, and, of course, the
war. Doriot's PPF is a party whose support base resembles Le
Pen's, but whose ideology and tactics do not.
The rinal party which I would like to discuss is the
PouJadist movement of the 1950's.
It began with Pierre PouJade,
a shopkeeper upset by the government's new tax enforcers (the
officials sent to investigate the widespread practice or tax
evasion).
pouJade claimed that this practice was an absolute
necessity ir small-town shopkeepers were to survive. pouJade
organized the Union in Derense or Shopkeepers and Artisans in
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1853. This group grew very quickly; in ract it grew so quickly
/ that it inspired him to turn it into a political party. His
deputies, including Jean-Marie Le Pen, took part in the 1956
legislative elections and were so successrul that. fifty-two or
them made it into the Parliament. The people who supported the
"PouJadists" were principally those who reared the impending
modernization or the country. This victory, however. did prove
to be quite temporary. Piel~re PouJade was not a skilled or
talented leader. In addition. their platrorm. which was
"ultra-conservative. ultra-nationalist. and decidedly--ir
mutedly--antisemetic." was not diverse enough to maintain a
serious rollowing. In ract. this party is noted ror being a
typical movement or the extreme right which disappeared about as
quickly as it appeared. This is in keeping with some or the
other movements I have discussed. ror example, both Doriot's
party and the French Social Party. 64
Where, then, can we draw the parallels between PouJadism
and the National Front? The latter has indeed very orten been
labeled a neo-PouJadist movement--a misnomer in the eyes or both
PouJade and Le Pen. Or course there are some similarities:
basic ideology, and support base. The National Front is, like
most or the parties discussed, nationalist, conservative,
perhaps even slightly anti-semetic, and certainly xenophobic.
Le Pen certainly draws some support rrom small businessmen as
well. What caused the raIl or PouJadism? PouJade did: he was
an inept leader, and was not capable or developing a more
diversified platrorm. Eventually. the party dissolved, leaving
.J
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its followers, like Le Pen. to create or attach themselves to
I/ other movements.
Our examination of these different French rightist
movements. has. perhaps. offered some ideas as to which elements
might be essential for continued success of a political party on
the right. The Action Fran9aise failed due to its lack of
political participation, thereby missing out on the
establishment of a loyal electorate. It was a sort of political
paralysis. Their dependence on Church support proved fatal when
the Church withdrew. Their organization and influence was not
strong enough to withstand this blow. While the Action
Franyaise failed due to internal problems, the French Social
Party plummeted due to external circumstances. The advent of
World War Two stopped this popular, diversified. and well
organized party in its tracks. Its leader was powerful and
charismatic. but he died before his party could be
reconstructed. Doriot's radical French Populist Party never
developed a diversified political platform, and therefore could
not generate a substantial and faithful electorate. Finally,
PouJade's party also maintained only a very limited platform.
but failed mostly because PouJade was not a gifted leader. and
he did not organize his party well.
In sum. then, some of the qualities which might prove
important in the fate of a political party are the following:
political participation and involvement; a strong, charismatic
leader; solid organization; a well diversified party platform; a
variegated, loyal, and voting, electorate; and finally, a
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political, social, and economic situation conducive to political
growth. Certainly, there are other Factors which play important
roles. However, From the study of the parties presented here,
these qualities appear to be most signiFicant.
What does a consideration of these Factors suggest in
regard to the Future success or the National Front? Certainly,
the National Front is well entrenched in the political electoral
system of France, with representatives and local party
headquarters allover the country. Le Pen has also proved
himselF to be a very strong and charismatic leader, who knows
well how to organize his party. Although the platForm of the
National Front is centered on a Few principle issues, there has
at least been an attempt to diversiFy the party platForm around
issues ranging From education to European deFense. Since 1984,
it seems there has been a development toward establishing an
electorate--but their ultimate loyalty has yet to be determined.
The Final condition is the social and political state of the
country, and this certainly cannot be predicted. It is, then,
entirely possible that the National Front will develop into a
powerFul party in the Future, assuming that Le Pen remains the
charismatic and undisputed leader that he is today.
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The success of the National Front has sent ripples
throughout the national and international political community.
It is a phenomenon which exemplifies the possibilities available
to small. marginal parties within the French electoral system.
The passionate patriot. Jean-Marie Le Pen. has taken his moral
and ethical beliefs to the public--and has received resounding
approval. Le Pen has followed up with stiff anti-immigration
proposals. He charges the primarily North African foreign
population with having severely contributed to the rising
unemployment and crime rates. This. along with his other themes
advocating strong state security. less bureaucracy. and
traditional values. is veiled in a shroud of fanatic
conservatism and patriotism.
Le Pen is the superb orator who has virtually
singlehandedly propelled the National Front from obscurity into
\
becoming the fourth major party in French politics. Over the
years, his electorate has evolved into one which houses
defectors from the established parties of both the left and the
right. Le Pen's supporters are generally encouraged by his
rhetoric, persuaded into believing· there is a way to relieve the
depressed economic conditions under which they suffer.
As the National Front's electorate has steadily increased.
Le Pen has extended his political influence. Le Pen's themes
have become every politician's themes, both rhetorically, and in
the form of concrete proposals. The question of whether or not
each politician negotiates with Le Pen is a personal decision.
However, one can be sure that it is very strategically
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calculated, and critically observed. Nevertheless, it is clear
that the National Front has affected contemporary French
politics in a significant way.
The reasons explaining why Le Pen's success deserves the
title "phenomenon," are now obvious. However, exactly what kind
of phenomenon will it end up being? Essentially, is the
National Front waning, or is it on the rise? This question I
have attempted to answer with my analysis of similarly
constructed parties. By isolating the fatal flaws of these
losing parties, one can perhaps more accurately prognosticate
the future of the National Front.
In my opinion, Le Pen has a good chance of promoting his
party, and increasing his political influence. His superior
leadership abilities allow him to both organize his party, and
strategically develop his platform. So far, his support base
has increased steadily, and it appears to be evolving into a
loyal political constituency. Naturally, there are certain
external circumstances which could severly curtail the party's
rise to power. In fact, since the 1988 elections, President
Mitterand has changed the election system back to one of
proportional representation. As a result, the National Front
received only one seat in the French parliament. This does not,
however, mean that the party has lost its support. On the
contrary, it is acknowledged that his electorate remains very
much in tact. Nevertheless, it looks as if the political
climate might be changing. Recently, another, ideologically
opposed party, the environmentalist Greens, celebrated up to
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twelve percent victories in certain areas or France. Clearly.
then. the political situation is ever-changing. and every
prediction is dependent on the stablility or the existing
system.
The eventual rate or the National Front hinges on various
elements. The most important ractor is probably the direction
in which the party's Breton captain leads it within the next rew
years. And. as Le Pen navigates his political ship through the
ocean or French politics. one can only wait and see whether he
will sink or swim.
\
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